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ABSTMCT
The middle-class is reportedto experience the "middle-class squeeze", where they arefacing a decliningrelative income
and simultaneously rising costs of living particularly with regards to housing, educqtion and health care. Besides,
the middle-class is also reported to face "the middle-class trap", where on the one hand, they are regarded ai "too
rich" to qualifi for any government support, but on the other hand, they found themselves in realily "not too rich"
to sustain their lives withoutfacing hardships. These observations unfortunately seem to be equally true in Malaysia,
which raises the need to scrutinise the likely impact of government policy on the middle-class. Iilith the recent fuel
subsidy rationqlisation in Malaysia, this paper attempts to analyse the likely welfore impact of this policy towards the
middle-class in the Malaysian society. Examining this issue is crucial and desirable since the problems faced by the
middle-class tend to be overlooked by the policy makers. In our analysis, we use various definitions of "middle-class"
as suggested in the literature, and examine the direct, indirect qnd the total welfare effects of fuel subsidy removal
on them using data from the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) 2004/2005 as well as the Input-Output Table for
2004/2005. Ourfindings reveal that, in line with the common perception, the benefts offuel subsidy accrued mostly to
the rich. Ironically, the costs of subsidy removal are borne mostly by the middle-class in terms of the direct effect. Yet
in terms of the indirect welfare effect, the costs of subsidy removal are borne equally by the middle-class as well as the
lower and the upper class. Since the indirect welfure effect outweighs the direct welfare effect, we conclude that while
the rich get most of the benefitsfromfuel subsidy, its removal hurts the middle-class the most. Ourfnding implies that
fuel subsidy rationalisation must befollowed by a practical strateglt and program to lessen the negative impact offuel
subsidy removal not only for the poori but also for the middle-clqss as well.
Kelwords: Fuel subsidy; welfure ffict; mtddle-class; Malaysia
ABSTMK
Isu berlcaitan kelas pertengahan telah dibangkitkan dalam media massa dan juga dalam penulisan akademik. Golongan
kelas pertengahan ini dilaporkan mengalami "pemerahan kelas pertengahan", iaitu mereka menghadapi pendapatan
relatif yang menurun dan pada masa yang sama mereka juga menghadapi peningkatan kos sara hidup teriltamanya
kos perumahan, pendidikan dan kesihatan. Selain itu, kelas pertengahanjuga dilaporkan menghadapi "perangkap
kelas pertenghan", iaitu dari satu segi mereka dianggap sebagai "terlalu kaya" untuk melayakkan mereka mendapat
bantuan dari kerajaan, tetapi dari segi yang lain mereka pada hakikatnya mendapati diri mereka "tidak terlalu kaya"
untuk mengekalkan kehidupan mereka tanpa menghadapi sebarang kesukaran. Pemerhatian inijuga dilihat berlaku di
Malaysia, dan ini menimbulkan keperluan untuk meneliti kesan dasar kerajaan pada keatas kebajikan kelas pertengahan
ini. Kajian ini meneliti kesan kebajikan akibat dasar rasionalisasi subsidi bahan api di Malaysia terhadap kelas
pertengahan dalam masyarakat Malaysia. Penelitian keatas isu ini adalah penting dan wajar kerana masalah yang
dihadapi oleh kelas pertengahan agak terabai oleh pembuat dasar. Dalqm kajian ini, dengan menggunakan pelbagai
definisi "kelas pertengahan" yang dicadangkan dalam kajian lepas, kesan langsung, kesan tidak langsung dan kesan
keseluruhan penghapusan subsidi bahan api keatas kebajikan kelas pertengahan dianalisis dengan menggunakan data
daripada Penyiasatan Perbelanjaan Isi Rumah (HES) 2004/2005 serta Jadual Input-Output 2004/2005. Hasil kajian
menunjukkan bahawa, selaras dengan tanggapsn umum, manfaat daripada subsidi bahan api sebahagian besarnya
dinilonati oleh golongan kaya. Ironinya, kesan langsungpenghapusan subsidi tersebut ditanggungsebahagian besarnya
oleh kelas pertengahan. Namun, dari segi kesan tidak langsung penghapusan subsidi, ianya ditanggung secara sama
rata oleh kelas pertengahan, kelas bawahan dan kelas atasan. Oleh kerana kesan kebajikan tidak langsung didapati
lebih besar daripada kesan kebajikan.langsung, kajicut itri membuat kesimpulan bahawa walaupun golongan kaya
ntendapat sebahagian besar manfaat daripada subsidi bahon api, namun dari segi kesan penghapusan subsidi bahan
api ianlta lebih dirasai oleh kelas pertengahan. Penenunn ini ntenuniukkan bahatra rasionalisctsi subsicli bahan opi
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mesti diikuti oleh satu strotegi dan program yang praktikal untuk.mengurangkan kescut negatifnya bukan sahaja untuk
golongan miskin, tetapi juga untuk kelas per.tengahan.
Kata kunci: Subsidi bahan api; kesan kebajikan; kelas pertengahan; Malaysia
INTRODUCTION
The issues with regards to the middle-class have been
highlighted in the mass media as well as in the academic
literature. In the western countries, such as the usn,
Canada and Europe, it has been reported that not only
there is a "disappearing middle-class" phenomenon
(Levy and Murnane 1992; Jenkins 1995; Wolfson
1994,1997), but the middle-class are also facing severe
socio-economic problems which is termed as "the
middle-class trap". The middle-class, who is generally
"neither rich nor poor", finds it difficult to sustain their
lives. While the poor qualify to receive various benefits
from government's welfare programs, the middle-class
on the other hand is considered "too rich" to qualify for
any support. For instance, while the poor may receive
subsidies to purchase a house, the middle-class are not
entitled to similar benefit. The same situation could be
said with regards to education and health services. While
the poor are subsidised by the government for these
services, and the rich could easily afford themselves to
get quality education and health services, the middle-
class on the other hand find themselves struggling hard.
Worse still, the continuous rise in property prices, as
well as the rising costs of education and health services
further erode their abilities to purchase decent homes
and to get access to good quality services. Consequently,
to sustain their lives, the middle-class finds that they
end up working their entire lives to serve their financial
commitments. Apparently, the middle class is pressured
from various forces to run faster just to stay at the
same place. It is therefore not surprising to find that
the middle-class is more vulnerable to severe financial
distress. The growing cases ofbankruptcies among this
income group indicate the severity of the situation. The
middle-class therefore could gradually fall into "the new
poor". Unfortunately, these observations appear to be
equally true in Malaysia.
In the context of the above observations, it might be
interesting to examine the likely impact of the Malaysian
government policy related to subsidy rationalisation
on the middle-class in Malaysia. In Malaysia, subsidy
bears a long history as a policy instrument to eradicate
poverty. During the New Economic Policy (Nee), subsidy
or free social service of basic amenities such as housing,
electricity, water, health and education have been widely
used as an instrument to uplift the standard of living of
the poor. Apparently, despite huge costs involved, it is
undeniably true that subsidies proved to be a strong tool
in helping the poor to get out of poverty. However, as
Malaysia moves through various developrnental stages,
the changes in political and economic landscapes at
both national and international level require a dynamic
transformation in policy implementation. In the New
Economic Model (Nerra), which is specified in the Tenth
Malaysia Plan (2011-2015), the government is planning
not only to rationalise fuel subsidy, but also various other
subsidies and price controls (Malaysia 2010: 76-77).
Basically, the aim is to remove market distortions in the
economy, and thus consumption and investment decisions
will be made based on true price signals. Consequently,
this will help improve economic efficiency and promote
economic growth and contribute towards realising the
goal of the NEM to become a high income nation. In
Malaysia, among the different types of subsidies, subsidy
on fuel has gained much attention since its allocation
constitutes a huge portion of the government annual
budget and perhaps unsustainable.In2009 for example,
out of Rv74 billion expenditures on total subsidies, the
subsidy on fuel constitutes RM23.5 billion (rrunNou). It
appears that the government is facing with budget deficit
and fiscal management difficulties, and the government
is trying to find ways and means to overcome those
problems. Since fuel subsidy allocation constitutes one of
the largest portions of the government total annual budget
on subsidies, reducing fuel subsidy seems appealing
and practical. Besides, fuel subsidy is considered as not
cost effective because it creates a substantial leakage of
benefits to the non-poor. Accordingly, the government is
phasing out fuel subsidy starting from 2004.
In this paper, we try to examine the likely impact of
fuel subsidy removal on household welfare, particularly
to the middle-class. Our particular interest on the middle-
class arises from the fact that this group ofsociety is the
group which is likely to face socio-economic problems,
i.e. "the middle-class trap" and that government policies
in general tend to overlook their problems. The imperative
of examining this issue lies with the fact that a strong
middle-class has been argued as essential for a vibrant
democracy and a healthy economy.
LITERATURE REVIEW
As in the case ofsubsidies for other goods and services,
many believe that fuel subsidies could benefit the
societies as well, particularly the poor, since lower
price of fuel will increase the welfare of the society.
The lower price of fuel will also stimulate growth and
development, and hence contribute to the increase in
income of the nation. Unfortunately, there is a gap
between theory and practice, where in practice it reveals
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quite a different story, painting rather a gloomy picture.
Recent evidence demonstrates how fuel subsidies may
turn out to be the contemporary plague of modern
society as they harm the natural environment, benefit
primarily those groups in society that do not need
support and might lead to fiscal crisis. ln addition, fuel
subsidies have failed the test of equity and economic
efficiency. Besides, there is also evidence that, subsidies,
particularly fuel subsidies, are costly when compared
to other alternative policies (Granado, Coady and
Gill ingham,20l0)1. This raises a question on the need
for fuel subsidy reform. Fuel subsidy reform on the other
hand, while desirable, raises the question on its likely
effects on the welfare of society.
There are many studies investigating the likely
impact of fuel subsidy reform on the welfare of society.
For instance, a cross-country studies by Coady et
al. (2006) shows that a 50o/o average increase in fuel
prices results on average in a 4.6 per cent decrease in
real incomes. Besides, it also has an impact on poverty.
Sugema et al. (2005), for example, in their study on the
poverty impact of fuel price adjustment in Indonesia
found that an increase in petroleum price by 29Yo will
increase poverty rate by 1.95 per cent. Besides, there are
also studies that examine the distributive effects of fuel
subsidy. For instance, Coady et al. (2010) discovered
that over 80% ofthe total benefits on gasoline subsidies
go to the richest 40% of households. For diesel and
liquefied petroleum gas, respectively, over 65%o and7Do/o
of benefits go to these income groups. Another study
by El-Said and Leigh (2006) on Gabon, reveals that the
richest l0% ofthe individuals receive about one-third
of the total subsidy. Meanwhile, the poorest 30% of
individuals receive only 13% ofall the subsidies. Thus,
these studies suggest that the benefits of fuel subsidy
are regressively distributed. The benefit of maintaining
low fuel prices is captured mostly by the higher income
groups, and hence, fuel subsidy becomes an inefficient
instrument for protecting the poor households and
ascertaining equity.
Despite numerous studies on the welfare effects of
subsidy removal on society, the studies that focus on the
middle-class are still lacking. This is understandable since
policy debate normally give greater weight to the plight
ofthe poor and the poorest ofthe society. Given the fact
that the plight of the middle-class tends to be overlooked
in the policy discussions, it is therefore important that
the implications of fuel subsidy removal on this income
group be rigorously analysed.
THE METHODOLOGY AND MODEL
THE DATA
ln  es t imat ing  the  we l fa re  e f fec t  o f  fue l  subs idy
renroval on household welfare, we ernploy three sets
of data published by the Department of Statistics
and the lvlinistry of Domestic Trade, Cooperatives
and Consumerism. The first data set is the data from
the Household Expenditure Survey (ues) 2004/2005
published by the Malaysian Department of Statistics.2
The HES report (200412005) provides exhaustive data
on household expenditures for a sample of slightly more
than 12,000 selected households in Malaysia in 2004 and
2005. Nevertheless, these detailed expenditure dataare
made available to the researchers for merely one-third
of them (i.e. 4,227 households). The expenditure data
are divided into l2 major categories, ranging from food
and non-alcoholic beverages to miscellaneous goods and
services. In each category, the expenditures are broken
down into a number of sub-categories which, in furn, are
broken down into even smaller sub-categories. Of the l2
major categories, only the fourth and seventh categories
contain data on petroleum (fuel) expenditures. In the
fourth category labelled as "Housing, Water, Electricity,
Gas and Other Fuel", there are five sub-categories,
of which the petroleum expenditures fall under the
heading "Electricity, Gas and Fuel". In the seventh
category labelled as "Transportation", there are three
sub-categories. In the second sub-category labelled as
"Managing the Private Transportation's Equipment",
there are four "minor" categories, ofwhich the petroleum
expenditures fall under the heading "Fuel and Lubricants
for Private Vehicles". For each household. the sum of
expenditures on "Electricity, Gas and Fuel" and "Fuel
and Lubricants for Private Vehicles" is taken as the
individual household's fuel expenditures.r Adding these
individual fuel expenditures across 4,227 households
yields the (aggregate) household's fuel expenditures.a
Dividing the household's fuel expenditures by the
household's total expenditures yields the budget share of
the aggregate petroleum product (i.e. fuel expenditures
as a percentage oftotal expenditures). The second set of
data is the Input-Output (I/O) table for 200412005.The
I/O table contains 120 sectors, ranging from paddy to
other private services. Hence, the I/O coefficient matrix
associated with the VO table is of dimension 120'120
(activity by activity).5
The third set of data is data with regards to fuel price
and fuel subsidy. Information on the prices of various
categories offuel as well as the subsidy provided to each
respective fuel category is made available by the Ministry
of Domestic Trade, ConsumerAffairs and Cooperatives.
In the context of Malaysia, there are three major fuel or
petroleum products consumed by households: RoN97,
RoN95 and diesel. As of December 2010, RoN97 was
sold at nu2.30/litre while its average market price was
nu2.96llitre;6 this means that the government provided
a subsidy of 22.3oh. By the sarne token, noN95 was
sold at nrul.90/litre while its average market price was
nu2.93/l itre; thus, the subsidy was 35.26Vo. Finally,
diesel was sold at nn,ll.80/litre while its average market
price was nu2.68/l itre; hence. the subsidy was 32.84o/o.
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lf the government removes the (entire) subsidy for each
petroleum product, then the price is expected to increase
by 28.69% for RoN97, 54.13% for noN95, 
'and 
49.08"/o
for diesel.T lfthe percentage increase in the price ofeach
of these petroleum products is multiplied by its quantity
share8 and the resulting product is sum over the three
petroleum products, we obtain the percentage increase in
the aggregate price of petroleum products. With simple
arithmetic, it can be easily shown that the aggregate price
ofpetroleum is expected to increase by 50.14% should
subsidy be removed.e
MEASURING THE WELFARE IMPACT OF FUEL SUBSIDY
REMOVAL
In order to measure the impact of an increase in the
price of fuel on the welfare of households, we follow
the approach developed and employed by Coady and
Newhouse (2005), and applied by Andriamihaja and
Vecchi (2007).In their empirical studies on Ghana and
Madagascar, respectively, the impact of a higher fuel price
on the household welfare is divided into two: the direct
welfare effect (owr) and the indirect welfare effect (we).
As the name implies, DwE refers to the adverse impact of
directly consuming petroleum products (e.g. consuming
gasoline for private transportation) by households when
the prices of petroleum products increase, whereas
IWE refers to the adverse impact of consuming other
goods and services (i.e. non-petroleum products) by
households when their prices increase in response to a
rise in petroleum prices.
Algebraically, DwE can be expressed as follows:
J(1) DWE:2.; ' ' tp;u
J - l
where wro'l is the budget share of the js peholeum product,
Apld is the change in the price ofthejft peholeum product,
and 
"/is the number of petroleurn products. By the same
token, IwE can be expressed as follows:
s
(2) IWE:l,wfttLql
J - l
where w, is the budget share of the j'h good (or service),
Aq, is the change in the consumer price of the j'h good
(or service), and S is the number of goods and services
available in the economy. Assurning that the prices of all
non-petroleum goods (and services) in the economy are
affected by a rise in petroleum prices, then
(3) Lqi=fl p"'\
whercJ,(Lp"'t) indicates that the change in the consumer
price of j'n non-petroleurn product is a function of the
change in the aggregate producer price of petroleum
products, Lpo".'u The change in the aggregate price of
petroleum products, in turn, is defined as the weighted
sum of  the change in the pr ices of  a l l  petro leurr
products:
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(4) Lp'":EU,oo""
where d, is the quantity share of the j 'h petroleum
product. The term "quantity share of a fuel product"
is not to be confused with the term "budget share of a
fuel product". While the former refers to the ratio of
the quantity ofa particular fuel product to the quantity
ofall fuel products, the latter refers to the ratio ofthe
expenditures on fuel to the expenditures on all goods
and services by households.
Substituting Eqs.(3) and (4) into Eq.(2), we obtain
1s) rwr : L wfi(Ln"'\ : fr .,r!rk a,Mf')
Adding Eqs.(l) and (5) yields the total welfare effect
(TWE) of a higher fuelprice:
r  !  l !  . \(6) rwt :Z,;" tp;" * Er,fJ,,Z d,oo;")
DWE IWE
Ofthe two, measuring owr is arelatively straightforward
task. Basically, it involves three steps. First, we identify
the petroleum products directly consumed by households
that are subject to price increases. Second, we identify
the budget share ofeach petroleum product consumed
by households before the price increase. Third, we
identif the price increases for each petroleum product.
Once all of these steps have been performed, DwE can
be calculated by multiplying the budget share of each
petroleum product by the percentage increase in the
price of each petroleum product and summing it over all
petroleum products. I I
Unlike DwE, calculating IwE is quite a daunting
task due to the difnculty involved in mapping between
producer prices and consumer prices. Obviously, such
mapping must take into consideration the production
structures of various sectors of the economy. In order
to circumvent this problem, we employ the price-
shifting model developed and employed by Coady
and Newhouse (2005) and followed by Andriamihaja
and Vecchi (2007).12 ln this model, the production
technology of the economy is assumed to be fully
described by the input-output (l/O) matrix, which
depicts the use of sectoral inputs in the production of
sectoral outputs. ln the case of Malaysia, the I/O table
for 200412005 contains I 20 sectors, ranging from paddy
to other private services. Hence, the l/O coefficient
matrix associated with the I/O table is of dimension
120'120 (activity by activity).
MEASURING THE "MIDDLE.CLASS''
Who is the middle-class? Are they being defined or
categorised for instance in terms of their material wealth
possession (e.g. incorne or consumption, employment),
or by their held values (e.g. style of living or political
views)? Which of these factors is rnore appropriate to
define the rnicldle-class? It seeurs that it depends on who
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and which perspectives one is looking at it - economic,
sociological or polit ical perspectives. As it is quite
problematic to figure out clearly who the middle-class is
in the society, naturally it is also quite difficult technically
to segregate the middle-class from the rest of the society.
Consequently, there is no one measure that will fully
capture the concept of middle-class.
In our analysis, the economic factor, i.e. income, is
treated as the main factor in defining the middle-class.
Thus, we define the middle-class as those households
who are categorised as the middle-income group. While
defining middle-class in this manner might not be entirely
satisfactory nonetheless we consider this is sufficient for
our purpose at hand. Nonetheless, the problem persists,
how do we segregate the middle-class based on their
income?
Fortunately, there are alreadyvarious ways suggested
in the literature to categorise the middle-class based on
their income. First. we could divide the total household
into quintiles. We then simply assume that the middle
income group contains those whose income falls between
the second, third and fourth quintile, i.e. upper middle-
class, middle middle-class and lower middle-class.
Defining middle-class in this way implies that 60% of the
society is considered as the middle-class. For instance,
Easterly (2001) defines the "middle class" as those
lying between the 20s and 80'h percentile on the income
distribution. Another common measure in categorising
the society based on their income is to group together
the second and third quintiles and regards this group as
the middle class. Thus, the households are grouped as
the following: top 20o/o, middle 40Yo and bottom 40%.
Meanwhile, Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato (2000) define
the middle class as those betweenT5 and 125 percent
of median per capita income. Quite similar definition
is suggested by Thurow (1984), where he defines the
middle-class by calculating the median income of the
society and regards those households with income 25o/o
below and above of the median income as the middle-
class. I 3
Yet another way of categorising the middle-class
is to define the middle-class by income threshold.
For instance, the Bank Negara Malaysia defines the
middle- income group as those who have income
threshold between RM2000 (uso667) to nu4000
(usol333) (Bank Negara Annual  Report  2008).  In
this study, to ensure the robustness of the results, we
employ four definitions of middle-class in our analysis.
These are: (i) middle 60%; (ii) middle 40%; (lii) +l-
25%o of median income; and, (iv) income threshold of
RM2000 - RM4000.
THE FINDINGS
This section discusses the findings of the study. Our
discussion is focused on exarnining the welfare irrpact of
removing fuel subsidy on the "middle-class" household
in Malaysia. We discuss the direct and indirect, as well
as the total welfare impact of fuel subsidy removal on the
middle-class household in particular, as well as on the
upper and lower classes. Here, we first briefly consider
income and fuel expenditure pattern of the three social
classes and then we discuss the welfare impact of fuel
subsidy removal on them.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ANAIYSIS
The total number of household in our analysis is 4225.
The average household income in Malaysia is nu2954,
while the average household expenditure is nu1906.
The median income is nu2l20. and therefore 25Yo
above the median income is nu2650, while 25% below
the median income is nu1590. Table I provides the
number and percentage of household, income range,
average income, and average expenditure of the
classes by various definition ofmiddle-class employed
in this study. It is obvious that defining the middle-
class as those who are neither at the top nor bottom
20olo constitute the largest number (or percentage) of
household categorised as the middle-class. On the
other hand, defining the middle-class as +l-25%o of
the median income constitute the smallest number
(or percentage) of middle-class is defined. Indeed,
only this definit ion of middle-class the number of
household categorised as the middle class is smaller
than the upper class. Thus, this definition of middle-
class might not reflect the reality, where the number (or
percentage) ofhousehold is generally perceived to be
larger than the upper class. Perhaps, the Bank Negara
Malaysia's definit ion of the middle-class (income
range of RM2000 - nrra4000) is close to reality. Using
this definition, we find that the average income and
average expenditure of the middle-class is close to
the average income and the average expenditure of
the total sample of household.
Table 2 shows the average fuel expenditure of
the various classes, as well as the ratio ofaverage fuel
expenditure of the upper and the middle classes to the
lower class (poorest household), and also the ratio of
fuel expenditure of the middle and lower classes to the
upper class (richest household). The average monthly
fuel expenditure of the total household is ru1185, while
the average rnonthly fuel expenditure of the middle-class
ranges between RMl28 - RMl77. We also found that the
average fuel expenditure of the middle-class is more or
less twice of the lower class (poorest household), and
about half of the upper class (richest household) fuel
expenditure.
Thus, it seelns that removing fuel subsidy is
justifiable as these figures show that the upper and the
rniddle classes is,rnost likely to benefit more frorn the
fuel subsidy than the lower class. However, while this
perception might be true, further investigatior, on the
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TABLE I . Number of Household, Income Range and Average Income by Various Definition of Middle-Class
Income Class Number Percentage Income range Average Income(RM) (RM)
Average Expenditure
(RM)
Upper 845
Middle Class: 60% of the middle ((i.e. 2'd, 3d and 4'h quintiles)
20% More than 3965 7338.91 3,849.80
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
2537
843
4225
60%
20%
100.00
2225.41
749.23
29s3.s7
1664.84
678.'10
1905.85
l 100 - 3965
Less than 1100
Middle Class:40% of the middle (i.e. 2'd and 3'd quintiles)
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
845
169l
1689
4225
20%
40%
40%
100.00
7338.91
2634.06
1079.50
2953.57
3,849.80
1906.02
93t.19
1905.85
More than 3965
1740 - 3965
Less than 1740
Middle Class = +l-25% of median income
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
l60 l
| 1 6
1508
4225
37.89
26.41
35.69
100.00
5392.64
2084.20
1009.28
2953.57
3060.10
1639.45
877.57
1905.85
More than 2650
1590 - 2650
Less than 1590
Middle Class = RM2000 - RM4000
Upper
Middle
Lower
823
t42l
l 98 l
19.48
33.63
46.89
7428.38
2814.52
1194.27
3888.87
1993.15
1019.39
More than 4000
2000 - 4000
Less than 2000
4225 100.00 2953.s7 1905.85
TABLE 2. Average Fuel Expenditure (RlvVmonth) by Various Deflnition of Middle-Class
Income Class Average fuel expenditure per month Ratio of Average fuel expenditure to(RM) the lower class (poorest household)
Ratio ofAverage fuel expendi-
ture to the upper class (richest
household)
Middle Class : 600/o of the middle ((i.e. 2nd, 3d and 4'h quintiles)
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
305.47
144.00
43.56
I  85 .14
7.01
3 .31
1.00
4.25
1.00
0.4'7
0.14
0.61
Middle Class = 40Yo of the middle (i.e. 2nd and 3'd quintiles)
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
305.47
167.04
70.46
I  85.  14
4.34
2.37
1.00
2.63
1.00
0.55
0.23
0.61
Middle Class = +l- 25% of median income
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
267.00
127.76
63.82
I  85 .  l 4
4 . 1 8
2.00
1.00
2.90
1.00
0.48
0.24
0.69
Middle Class = RM2000 - RM4000
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
308. I 5
r77.03
78.14
I  8 5 . 1 4
3.94
2.27
t .00
2 .37
1.00
0.57
0.25
0.60
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welfare effects of fuel subsidy removal is necessary
since the welfare effects of removing fuel subsidy is
quite complicated, and hence, the upper ctass might not
necessarily receive more adverse effects than the poor.
THE WELFARE EFFECTS
THE DIRECT WELFARE FFECT (DWE)
Table 3 shows the budget share offuel expenditure and
the estimated direct welfare effect of an increase of fuel
prices on the various classes. Our analysis shows that
if there is a 50.14o/o increase in fuel price, household
expenditure will have to increase by 3.75% to maintain
their standard of living.14 As for the middle-class, we
find that the middle-class household will have to increase
their expenditure between 3.84% - 4.33o/o to maintain
their level of comfort. Interestingly, this percentage is
higher than for the upper (3.5 - 3.76%) and the lower
class (2.94 - 3.51o/o). Thus, it is interesting to note that,
contrary to the general perception that the richest will be
hurt most from fuel subsidy removal, our study reveals
that the direct welfare effect is larsest to the middle
income group.
THE INDIRECT WELFARE FFECT (IWE)
Table 4 shows the budget share, price effect as well as
the indirect welfare effect of an increase in fuel prices
by various categories of goods and services. In terms
ofbudget share, it could be clearly seen that Housing,
Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels formed the
largest share in total household expenditwe (27.0o/o),
followed by Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages
(20.7%),Transport (15.9%) and Restaurants and Hotels
(11 3%). In terms of the price effects of an increase in
fuel prices, our analysis shows that the highest impact
is on Transport (1.4%), followed by Housing, Water,
Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels (l.l%), Recreation
Services and Culture (1 .0%), and Food and Non-
Alcoholic Beverages (1.0%).
As far as the indirect welfare impact of fuel price
increase is concerned, we discover that a 50.14%
increase in fuel price will reduce household real income
(purchasing power) by 7.0%. We also find that there
are three sectors that contributed the most to the total
reduction in purchasing power. These are Housing,
Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels (27.7%),
Transport (26.5%), and Food and Non-Alcoholic
Beverages (23.5%). Thus, these three sectors contributed
more than three-quarter (77 .7%o) of thetotal reduction in
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TABLE 3. Fuel Budget Shares and Direct Welfare Effect of the Middle-Class
lncome Class Average Expenditure(P'I\'t)
Budget share Direct Welfare Effect resulting from
(% offuel expenditure) price change (%o)
Middle Class = 60% of the middle ((i.e. 2nd, 3'd and 4'h quintiles)
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
3853.70
r664.84
678.70
1905.85
6.99
8.  l9
5.87
7.47
3.50
4 . 1 1
2.94
3.75
Middle Class = 40%o f the middle (i.e. 2'd and 3d quintiles)
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
3853.70
1906.02
93 l .  19
1905.85
6.99
8.40
6.90
7.47
3.50
4.21
3.46
3.75
Middle Class : +l- 25% of median income
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
3060. l0
1639.45
877.57
l 905.85
7.49
7.66
6.83
7.47
3.'16
3.84
3.42
3.75
Middle Class = RM2000 - RM4000
Upper
Middle
Lower
TOTAL
3888.87
1 993.1 5
1019 .39
I  905.85
7.01
8.63
7.00
7.47
3 .51
4.33
3 .51
3 .7  5
Nore: As 3l" Decernber 2010. the removal of fuel subsidies on RON95. RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in
Malaysia by 50.14"1,)
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TABLE 4. Indirect welfare effects of removing fuel subsidies in Malaysia
Sector
Budget Shares Price Effects
(%) (%)
Impact on Ex- Per cent ofTotal
penditure (%) Impact (%)
(1 x  2) /100
0 I -Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages
02-Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco
03-Clothing and Footwear
04-Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and
Other Fuels
O5-Fumishing, Household Equipment and
Routine Household Maintenance
06-Health
07-Transport
08-Communication
O9-Recreation Services and Culture
l0-Education
I l-Restaurants and Hotels
I 2-Miscellaneous Goods and Services
TOTAL
20.66
t .92
3.44
20.96
4.59
t .4 l
15.90
s .  l 5
4.45
1.86
1 1 . 3 3
8.33
100.0
7.92
0.89
3 . 1 4
9.22
3 .3  1
| . 37
I  1.63
0.46
8.01
r .25
3.28
5.76
1.64
0.02
0 . 1 1
1 .93
0 .15
0.02
1 .85
0.02
0.36
0.02
0.37
0.48
6.97
23.48
0.24
1 .55
2',t.73
2 . 1 8
0.28
26.53
0.34
s . t2
0.33
5 .33
6.89
100.00
Note: As 31" December 2010, the removal of fuel subsidies on RON95, RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in
Malaysia by 50.14%
household real income. This is not surprising at all since
the magnitude of the indirect welfare effect basically
depends on the size ofthe budget share as well as the
magnitude of the price effects of the respective sectors.
Apparently, these three sectors not only make up a
relatively large share in total household expenditure,
but these three sectors also suffer a relatively large price
effects compared to the other sectors.
We further investigate the indirect welfare effectby
various classes, which are shown in Table 4.1 - Table
4.4. It could be clearly seen from Table 4.1 -Table 4.2
that while there are differences in the size or magnitude,
the budget share of these three sectors - Housing,
Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels; Food and
Non-Alcoholic Beverages; and Transport - constitute a
substantial share in the total household expenditure of
each income group. Nonetheless, there are noticeable
differences in the budget share pattern ofthe upper class
compared to the middle and lower classes. We discover
that the highest budget share of the upper class goes
to Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels,
followed by Transport, and Food and Non-Alcoholic
Beverages. On the other hand, Food and Non-Alcoholic
Beverages constituted the highest budget share for the
lower and the middle classes. followed bv Housins.
Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels, and then
Transport. Besides, it is also interesting to note that
the budget share of the lower and the middle classes
is quite significantly higher than the upper class not
only in Food and Non-Alcoholic Beverages, but also in
Housing, Water, Electricity, Gas and Other Fuels. The
upper class on the other hand has a significantly higher
budget share in Transport compared to the lower and
the middle classes.
Interestingly, the indirect welfare effects of fuel
subsidy removal on the various classes are small and
about even. We discover that a 50.14olo increase in
fuel price will generally reduce household real income
(purchasing power) ofeach ofthe respective classes by
about 7.0o/o. Nonetheless, the sectors that contributed
to this reduction in purchasing power are different
for different classes due to differences in the budget
share pattern for each income group. This is quite easy
to understand since the indirect welfare effect of the
increase in fuel price will only depend on the size of
the budget share ofthe respective class in the various
sectors of goods and services. The price effects of an
increase in fuel prices, on the other hand, are sirnilar
for all of the income groups.
TABLE 4. l. Indirect Welfare Effects of Removing Fuel Subsidies by Sector and
lncome Group in Malaysia (Middle Class = 60% of the middle ((i.e. 2nd, 3'd and 4'h quintiles)
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UPPER (Top 20% - Richest)
Budget Shares (%) (l)
Price Efl'ects (%) (2)
hnpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)i 100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
15 .  t 0
7.919
t . t96
17.25
1 .59
0.889
0 .014
0.20
3.09
3 . 1 3 5
0.097
1.40
18.53
I  1.63
2. t55
3 l . 08
5.88
0.459
0.027
0.39
5.58
8.013
0.447
6.45
2.37
1.249
0.030
0.43
I1 .07
3.279
0.363
5.23
t9.87 5.41 r.62
9.221 3.3t2 r.367
1.833 0.179 0.022
26.43 2.58 0.32
9.90 t00.0'
5.761
0.570 6.933
8.23 100.00
MIDDLE (Middle 60%)
Budget Shares (%) ( I )
Price Efl'ects (%) (2\
lmpact on Expenditure (%) ( l)x(2/100
Pcfcent of Total Impact (%)
25.5  5
7.9t9
1.848
26.44
2 . r0
0.889
0.019
0.27
3.68
3 .135
0 . 1 1 5
t.65
14.96
I1 .63
t .740
24.90
4.87
0.459
0.022
0.32
3.88
8.013
0 .311
4.45
1 .57
t.249
0.020
0.28
I 1 . 5 7
3.279
0.379
5.43
2 l . l r  4 .12  1 .30
9.22t 3.312 r.367
t.947 0.136 0.018
27.86 1.95 0.25
7.5t  100.0
5.761
0.433 6.988
6. t9 100.00
LOWER (Bottom 20%o - Poorest)
Budget Shares (%) ( I )
Price Efl'ects (%) (2)
lmpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total lmpact (%)
32.56
7.9t9
2.579
36.62
2.46
0.889
0.022
0 .31
3.68
3 .135
0 . 1 1 5
t .64
7.88
I  1.63
0.9t7
13.02
3.06
0.459
0.014
0.20
2.26
8 .013
0 . 1 8 1
2.57
l .  t 4
r.249
0.014
0.20
I 1 . 0 5
3.279
0.362
5 .  l 4
25.98 3.39 1.08
9.22t 3.3t2 r.367
2.396 0.112 0.01s
34.03 1.60 0.2r
5.45 100.0
5.761
0.314 7.041
4.46 100.01
Nd/e: As 3l*' December 2010, the removal of fuel subsidies on RON95, RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in Malaysia by 50.14%
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TABLE 4.2. Indirect Welfare Effects of Removing Fuel Subsidies by Sector and
Income Group in Malaysia (Middle Class : 40% Of The Middle (.E. 2"t And 3'd Quintiles)
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UPPER (Top 20% - Richest)
Budget Shares (%) ( l)
Price EfTects (%) (2)
hnpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
r  5 . 1 0
7.919
r. t96
l7.25
1 .59
0.889
0.014
0.20
3.09
3 . 1 3 5
0.097
1.40
18.53
11 .63
2.155
3  1 .08
5.88
0.459
0.027
0.39
5.58
8 .013
0.447
6.45
2.37
t .249
0.030
0.43
I  1.07
3.279
0.363
5.23
19.87 5.41 1.62
9.221 3.312 r.367
1.833 0.t79 0.022
26.43 2.58 0.32
9.90 100.0'
5.', l61
0.570 6.933
8.23 100.00
MIDDLE (Middle 40%)
Budget Shares (o/") (l)
Price EfTects (%) (2)
Impact on Expenditure (%) ( l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
21.95
7.9r9
1 .738
24.90
2.03
0.889
0 .018
0.26
3.62
3 . 1 3 5
0 .1  14
1 .63
r  5.83
1 1.63
1 .841
26.37
5.09
0.459
0.023
0.33
4 . 1 7
8 .013
0.334
4.79
1.70
1.249
0.021
0.30
tl.67
3.279
0.383
5.48
20.75 4.24 1.36
9.22t 3.312 1.367
1.914 0.140 0.019
27.41 2.01 0.27
7 .59 100.0
5.761
0.437 6.982
6.27 100.00
LOWER (Bottom 40%o - Poorest)
Budget Shares (%) ( l)
Price Eflects (%) (2)
hnpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
29.52
7.919
2.338
3 3 . 3 1
2.37
0.889
0.021
0.30
3.80
3. r35
0 .1  19
1.70
10.61
I1 .63
1.234
17.58
3.77
0.459
0.017
0.25
2.69
8 .013
0 .215
3.07
1 . 1 4
r.249
0 .014
0.20
1 1 . 1 8
3.279
0.367
5.22
23.63 3.60 l.r0
9.221 3.312 t.367
2. t79 0.119 0.015
31.04 1.70 0.21
6.60 100.0
5.761
0.380 7.018
5.42 100.00
\
F.
s
aAo/d: As 31"' December 2010, the removal of tuel subsidies on RON95, RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in Malaysia by 50.l4%
TABLE 4.3. Indirect Welfare Effects of Removing Fuel Subsidies by Sector and Income Group in Malaysia (Middle Class : +/- 25% Of Median Income) (\
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UPPER
Budget Shares (%) ( I )
Price Efl'ects (%) (2)
lmpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
16.93
7.9t9
L341
16.93
1.64
0.889
0.015
1.64
5.68
0.459
0.026
5.68
5 .  l 6
8.013
0.413
5 .  l 6
2.21
1.249
0.028
2 .21
[ .42
3.279
0.374
n.42
3.23 20.21 5.10 r.57 17.59
3.135 9.22t 3.312 r.367 11.63
0.101 1.864 0.169 0.021 2.045
3.23 20.21 5.10 1.57 17.59
9.26 100.0
5.76r
0.533 6.931
9.26 100.00
MIDDLE (Middle Class = +l-25o/oof median income)
Budget Shares (%) (l)
Price Eff'ects (%) (2)
Impact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
23.70
7.919
| .877
23.70
2.28
0.889
0.020
2.28
4.77
0.459
Q.022
4.77
3.87
8 .013
0 .310
3.87
1.45
1.249
0.01 8
1 .45
I  l . l 4
3.279
0.365
I  l . l 4
3.73 20.74 3.93 r.24 rs.1s
3.135 9.221 3.312 r.367 11.63
0.1 t7  r .912 0 .130 0 .017 1 .831
3.73 20.74 3.93 1.24 15.75
7.42 100.0
5.76r
0.427 '7.047
7.42 100.00
Budget Shares (%) ( l )
Price Ef'f'ects (Vo) (2)
Irnpact on Expenditure (%) ( l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
30.26
7.9t9
2.396
30.26
2.43
0.889
0.022
2.43
3.82
3 . 1 3 5
0.120
3.82
24.04
9.221
2 .2 t7
24.04
3.60
3.312
0 .1  19
3.60
1.05
1.367
0.014
1.05
9.87
I  1.63
1 . 1 4 8
9.87
3.70
0.459
0.017
3.70
2.66
8.013
0.2r3
2.66
l . l 3
1.249
0 .0 t4
1 . 1 3
n.25
3.279
0.369
| .25
6.18 r 00.0
5.76r
0.356 7.005
6. l 8 100.00
Vo/c: As 31"' December 2010, the removal of fuel subsidies on RON95, RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in Malaysia by 5Q l4%
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TABLE 4.4. Indirect Welfare Effects of Removine Fuel Subsidies bv Sector and Income Group in Malavsia (Middle Class : RM2000 - RM4000\
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UPPER
Budget Shares (%) ( l)
Price Efl-ects (%) (2)
hnpact on Expenditure (%) ( l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
15.07
7.919
1 . 1 9 3
15.07
1.56
0.889
0.014
L56
5.85
0.459
0.027
5.85
5.56
8 .013
0.446
). )o
2.36
1.249
0.029
2.36
I  1 .08
3.279
0.363
I  1.08
3.08 19.92 5.40 l.61 18.63
3.135 9.221 3.312 1.367 11.63
0.096 1.837 0.t79 0.022 2.166
3.08 19.92 5.40 l.6r 18.63
9.88 100.0
5.761
0.569 6.942
9.88 100.00
MIDDLE (Middle Class: RM2000 - RM4000)
Budget Shares (%) ( l )
Price Eff'ects (Yo) (2)
Impact on Expenditure (%) ( l)x(2)i  100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
2 t . 5 6
7.9t9
1.707
2 t .56
2.01
0.889
0 .018
2.01
5.22
0.459
0.024
5.22
4.35
8 .013
0.348
4.35
1 .79
1.249
0.022
1.79
I  1.70
3.279
0.384
I  1 .70
3.61 20.7 |  4 .33 r .4r  15.56
3.135 9.221 3.312 1.367 11.63
0 .113  1 .910  0 .143  0 .019  1 .809
3.61 20.7 |  4 .33 l .4 l  15.56
7.76 100.0
5.761
0.447 6.945
7 .76 100.00
Budget Shares (%) ( l)
Price Efl'ects (%) (2)
Lnpact on Expenditure (%) (l)x(2)/100
Percent of Total Impact (%)
28.27
7.919
2.239
28.27
2.35
0.889
0.021
2.35
3.79
3 .  1 3 5
0 .1  19
3.79
22.95
9.221
2.116
22.95
3.67
3.312
0.121
3.67
L l 0
r .367
0.015
l . l 0
12.06
I  1.63
1.403
12.06
3.93
0.459
0 .018
3.93
2.84
8 .013
0.228
2.84
l .  l 6
1.249
0 .015
l . l 6
n . 2 l
3.279
0.367
n . 2 l
6.67 100.0
5.',t61
0.385 7.046
6.67 100.00
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Vrrre: As 3 l'' December 20 I 0. the removal of fuel subsidies on RON95, RON97 & DIESEL will result in the average change in fuel prices in Malaysia by 50. l4%
Fuel Subsidy Rationalisation: The Perils ol the Middle Class in Malavsia
THE TOTAL WELFARE FFECT (TWE)
The total welfare effect of an increase.in fuel price
could be obtained by summing up its direct and indirect
effects. Table 5 shows the total welfare effect of fuel
price increase, which figures are apparently derived from
Table 4.1 - Table 4.4. Overall, our study reveals that a
50.14% increase in fuel prices will reduce household
real income (purchasing power) by 10.7%. This means,
for every RM100 of total household expenditure, there is
a loss of purchasing power equal to nv10.70. We also
discover that a large percentage (65.0%) of the total
welfare loss is attributed to the indirect effect of the fuel
price increase. ln this regards, our findings appear to be
in agreement with the findings of the previous studies
in which the indirect welfare effect tends to dominate.
Besides, while the indirect welfare effect contributed
more to total welfare loss, the percentage contribution
95
TABLE 5. Total Welfare Effect of Fuel Price Increase (o/o of Total Household Expenditure) in Malaysia
Welfare Effect UPPER MIDDLE LOWER ALL
Household
Middle Class = 60% of the middle ((i.e. 2nd, 3'd and 4'h quintiles)
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
DWE as % of Total
IWE as % of Total
Share of the Burden
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
3.505 4.106
6.933 6.988
10.44 11.09
33.58 37.01
66.42 62.99
37.50 56.9',1
40.23 52.59
39.27 54.13
2.943
7.041
9.98
29.48
70.52
5.53
7 . l 8
6.60
3.745
6.969
10.71
34.96
65.04
100.00
100.00
100.00
Middle Class : 40Yo of the middle (i.e. 2o and3'o quintiles)
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
DWE as %o of Total
IWE as % of Total
Share ofthe Burden
Direct Welfare Fffect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
3.505
6.933
10.44
33.58
66.42
37.50
40.23
39.27
4.214
6.982
11.20
37.64
62.36
44.64
40.1 
41.71
3.46
7 .018
10.48
33.02
66.98
t7.87
19.66
19.03
3.745
6.969
10.71
34.95
65.05
100.00
100.00
100.00
Middle Class : +l-25oA of median income
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
DWE as % of Total
IWE as % of Total
Share ofthe Burden
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effecl
Total Welfare Effect
3.757
6.931
10.69
3 5 . 1 5
64.85
61.44
60.51
60.83
3.839
7.047
10.89
35.26
64.74
23.44
22.97
23 . t4
J . + Z J
7.005
10.43
32.82
67 .18
15.12
16.52
16.03
3 .  t + 5
6.969
10.71
34.94
65.06
100.00
100.00
100.00
Middle Class = RM2000 - RM4000
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
DWE as % of Total
IWE as % of Total
Share of the Burden
Direct Welfare Effect
Indirect Welfare Effect
Total Welfare Effect
3 .5 r3
6.942
10.45
33.60
66.40
36.75
39.s9
38.59
4.329
6.945
I t .27
38.40
61 .60
40.07
35.05
36.82
3.512
7.046
10.56
3.1 .zo
66.'74
2 3 . 1 8
25.36
24.59
3.743
6.969
10.71
34.94
65.06
100.00
100.00
100.00
Ncr re :  As3 l "December20 l0 . t he remova l  o f f ue l  subs id i esonRON95 .RON9T&DIESELw i l l  r esu l t i n t hea r , e ragechange in fue l  p r i ces i n
Malaysia by 50.  14'Z '
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of the indirect welfare effect is noticeably quite higher
for the lower class compared to the rest of the income
classes. This implies that the rise in the general price of
goods and services (due to fuel price increase) affects
the lower class more than the upper and middle classes.
We also discover another interesting observation,
which is worthy to be highlighted. Our analysis reveals
thata50.l4%o increase in fuel prices will reduce middle-
class household real income (purchasing power) by
ranging from 10.9% - 11.3yo, which is noticeably
higher than the upper and lower classes, regardless of
the definition of the middle-class used. Our findings
also show that in terms of the burden of the total welfare
effects, the share of the middle-class is higher than the
upper and lower classes when middle-class is defined
as middle 60%o and middle 40%. Thus, our findings
generally imply that the middle-class is hurt most from
the fuel subsidy removal. Perhaps, this is due to the fact
that their fuel budget share is larger than that ofthe upper
or the lower classes.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The intention ofthe government to carry out fuel subsidy
reform in Malaysia entails investigation on the impact
of subsidy removal on household welfare, particularly
on the middle-class. While the rationale for reducing
subsidy is to ease the financial burden of the government
is commonly understood, its consequences on the welfare
of the middle-class however remain to be discovered.
This study is motivated by the desire to explore the
likely effect of subsidy removal on the welfare of the
middle-class since the question with regards to the plight
of the middle-class has been highlighted in the mass
media as well as in the academic literature such as the
"middle-class squeeze", or "the middle-class trap". We
believe that examining the likely impact of fuel subsidy
removal would shed some light on the debate about the
middle-class.
Based on the empirical evidences discovered in
our study, it can be concluded that our findings lend
support to the commonly held view that the upper class
(richest section of the society) benefitted the most from
fuel subsidy. Therefore, removing fuel subsidy appears
justifiable. However, while fuel subsidy reform appears
to be justified, nonetheless it must be managed properly.
As our study reveals, removing fuel subsidy not only
hurt the poor, but quite surprisingly, it also indicated
that it is the middle-class that will be hit the most. Thus,
our finding calls for a careful implernentation of the fuel
subsidy reform to mitigate its impact on these groups.
The reform rnust be followed by a practical strategy and
program to lessen the impact on the lower as well as on
the middle income group. Perhaps to help compensate
them, several mitigating rneasures are needed. Some of
the pract ica l  pol icy implernentat ions inc ludes arnong
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others: wider provision of affordable houses especially in
the city, ensuring a stable food price through promotion
and incentives targeting at increasing local supplies. The
study has also shown that households are spending a large
proportion of their income on hire purchase. Reduction
in import tariff will certainly be translated into lower
price of cars and will help them to allocate some of the
saving to lessen their burden. It is therefore suggested
that a major adjustment in import tariff for cars is carried
out as to ensure that people could afford to buy cars at a
reasonable price.
ENDNOTES
I The study by Granado, Coady and Gillingham (2010) on
developing countries shows that the cost oftransferring one
dollarto the 20olo poorest households via gasoline subsidy
is around 33 dollars (i.e., $1/0.03). They further argued
that, if 1 5 out ofevery I 00 dollars to be allocated to a safety
net program is absorbed by administrative costs and 80%o
ofthe remaining 85 dollars inbeneficiary transfers reaches
the poor (or 68% ofthe total budget), then the cost-benefit
ratio for such a program is 1.5 dollars (i.e., $1/0.68). This
shows that the opportunity cost of subsidising fuel is high
and costly. This justifies the subsidy reform embarked upon
by many countries including Malaysia.
2 The last HES data is HES 200912010, but has not yet been
published at the time this research was conducted. HES
data are generally considered to be high quality data, and
are extensively used in various researches.
3 By the same token, the individual household's total
expenditures are defined as the sum of expenditures on
all goods and services for each household.
4 Similarly, adding the individual household's total
expenditures across 4,227 households yields the
(aggregate) household's total expenditures.
5 The last estimated I/o table is in 2009/2010, but has not
yet been published at the time this research was conducted)
6 The term "average market price" is used because the actual
market price differs across three broad geographical areas
in Malaysia: Peninsular Malaysia, Sarawak and Sabah.
7 All of the stated fuel prices are taken from (provided
by) the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperative and
Consumerism.
8 Of the three, RON95 captures 56.3% of the quantity share,
diesel 35%, and RON97 8.7% (calculated from figures
provided by the Ministry of Domestic Trade, Cooperative
and Consumerism).
9 Lp'" - >'r=, Arnni" - 6oornrLpro,.", * d*,r,unrAp*o.r* t
6o;.".rLpoi"""t: (0.563 x 28.69) + (0.35 x 54.13) + (0.087
x 49.08) = 50.14%.
I 0 Note that q is used to denote the consumer price of a good
while p the producer price of a good.
1l In this study, our calculation using a simple arithrnetic
shows that the removal of fuel subsidy will increase the
aggregate price of petroleum by 50.14o/o. For the DwE,
we irnposed a strong assumption that household's do
not substituting away from fuel when there is a change
in price. This can be interpreted as short run impact
rvhere households are rrot flexible enough to adjust their
consurrrpt ion orr fuel.
Fuel Subsidy Rationalisation: The Perils of the Middle Class in Mulat;sict
12 As for the IWE, we implicitly assumed zero demand price
elasticity which is also considered as a short term impact.
l3 The various measures of the middle class sriggested in the
literature have been discussed by Ravallion (2010).
14 This estimation should be cautiously interpreted srnce we
are using data from the HES 200412005 data. It should be
mentioned here that in 200412005, most household appear
to use RON97 since the govemment did not remove the
subsidy on fuel yet. Hence, it is not surprising to find
that RON97 formed the largest share of fuel expenditure
in 200412005. Fuel subsidy is reduced, particularly on
RON97, starting in 2009.
REFERENCES
Andriamihaja, A. A. and Vecchi, G. 2007. An Evaluation of the
Welfare Impact of Higher Energy Prices in Madagascar.
Africa Region Working Paper Series No. 106, June 28,
2007.
Bank Negara Malaysia. 2009. Bank Negara Annual Report
2008.
Birdsall, N., Graham, C. and Pettinato, S. 2000. Stuck In The
Tunnel: Is Globalization Muddling The Middle Class?
Brookings Institution, Center on Social and Economic
Dynamics wP No. 14,2000.
Coady, D andNewhouse, D. 2005. Evaluating the Distribution
ofReal Income Effects oflncreases in Petroleum Product
Prices in Ghana, International Monetary Fund, mimeo.
Coady, D, Gillingham, R., Ossowski, R., Piotrowski, J., Tareq,
S. and Tyson, J. 20 10. Petroleum product subsidies: Costly,
inequitable and rising. IMF Staff Position Note, SPN/l 0/05.
Washington D.C: Intemational Monetary Fund.
Coady, D., El-Said, M., Gillingham, R., Kpodar, K., Medas, P.
and Newhouse, D. 2006. The magnitude and distribution of
' fuel subsidies: Evidence from Bolivia, Ghana, Jordan, Mali
and Sri Lanka. IMF Working Paper,06 (247). Washinglon
D.C: Intemational Monetary Fund.
Easterly, W. 2001. The middle class consensus and economic
development. Journal of Economic Growth 6(4): 3 17 -335 -
El-Said, M. and Leigh, D. 2006. Fuel price subsidies in Gabon:
Fiscal cost and distributional impact. IMF Working Paper,
06 (243). Washington D.C: International Monetary Fund.
Granado, J., Coady, D. and Gillingham, R. 2010. The unequal
benefits of fuel subsidies: A review of evidence for
. 
developing countr ies, IMF Working Paper, l0(202),
Washington D.C: Intemational Monetary Fund.
Jenkins, S. P. 1995. Did the middle class shrink during the
1980s? UK evidence from kernel density est imates.
Economics Letters 49'. 407 413.
Levy, F. and Mumane, R. J. 1992. U.S. Earnings levels and
eamings inequality: Areview of recent trends and proposed
explanations. Journal of Economic Literature, American
Economic Association 30(3): I 333-138 l.
Malaysia. 2070. Tenth Malaysian Plan 20II-2015. Kuala
Lumpur: National Printers.
PEMANDU. undated. http://w\ilw.ngv.com.my/documents/949_
pemandusubsidy.pdf.
Sugema, L, Hasan, M., Oktaviani, R., Viliani, A. and Ritonga,
H. 2005. Dampak kenaikan harga BBM dan efektivitas
program kompensasi. INDEF Working Paper. http://www.
indef.or.id/download/pubs/BBM.PDF
Thurow, L. 1984. The disappearance of the middle Class. New
York Times, February 5, Section F3.
Wolfson, M. C. 1994. When inequalities diverge. American
Economic Review 84( Papers and Proceedings): 353-358.
Wolfson, M. C. 1997. Divergent inequalities: Theory and
empirical results. Review of Income and Wealth 43'.
401421.
Roslan Abdul-Hakim*
Othman Yeop Abdullah
Graduate School of Business
Universiti Utara Malaysia
06010 UUM Sintok, Kedah Darul Aman
MAI-AYSIA
Russayani Ismail**
Nor Azam Abdul-Razak*i!*
School ofEconomics
Finance and Banking
Universiti Utara Malaysia
06010 UUM Sintok, Kedah Darul Aman
MALAYSIA
*ahroslan@uum.edu.my
**russ1140@uum.edu.my
* **azam@uum.edu.my
97
